The expansion of state authority over the neighbouring states through informal migration controls: the case of Hungary’s control over Serbia by Ashraf, Tasawar et al.
The expansion of state authority over the neighboring states through informal
migration controls: the case of Hungary’s control over Serbia







Link to publication in ResearchOnline
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Ashraf, T, Korkut, U & Gyollai, D 2019, 'The expansion of state authority over the neighboring states through
informal migration controls: the case of Hungary’s control over Serbia', Spanish Yearbook of International Law,
pp. 306-316. https://doi.org/10.17103/sybil.23.20
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please view our takedown policy at https://edshare.gcu.ac.uk/id/eprint/5179 for details
of how to contact us.
Download date: 28. Apr. 2020
 20 SYbIL (2016) x – y DOI: 10.17103/sybil.20. 
 
The Expansion of State Authority Over the Neighbouring States Through Informal 





Abstract: Our preliminary fieldwork shows that there is large scale agreement between the migration and border authorities of 
Hungary and Serbia on the names of asylum seekers before they are allowed into to the Hungarian transit zones and apply for 
international protection in Hungary. The list, proposed by the Serbian Commissariat for Refugees (SCR) and approved by the 
Hungarian border authorities, is communicated through the use of community leaders from the Serbian reception centre. 
Hungary’s motive behind keeping its cooperation with Serbia informal is to conceal the existence of cooperation between both 
states and to avoid legal challenges in the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
Therefore, the paper argues that the informalisation of migration management constitutes a significant challenge for the authority 
of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 (hereinafter referred as the Refugee Convention). The paper 
further argues that Hungary’s informal cooperation with Serbia is a form of expansion of the Hungarian state authority under the 
principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction of a state. Therefore, despite informal nature of Hungary’s migration cooperation with 
Serbia, the responsibility for violations of asylum seekers rights in Serbia and their exclusion from international protection 
continues to engage Hungary for the reason of having effective control on the migration management in Serbia. 
 
Keywords: Asylum Seekers, Exclusion, Informalisation of Migration, International protection, State responsibility, wrongful Act. 
 
(A) INTRODUCTION  
 
The principle of non-refoulement enshrined in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention has not been expressly 
recognised in the European Union (EU) treaty law. In the EU law, the principle of non-refoulement has been 
recognised through the judgement of the ECtHR in the case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy.1 The ECtHR 
construed Article 3 of the ECHR to include a prohibition on returning asylum seekers to territories where 
their lives and freedom could be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, or membership of a 
particular social group. The Court held that Italy could not evade its responsibility arising from Article 3 of 
the ECHR by relying on the obligations arising from the bilateral agreement with Libya even if there was an 
express provision for the return of irregular migrants. In the EU Law, prohibition on returning asylum 
seekers to inhuman and degrading treatment is recognised under Article 4 of the Charter of the 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2001 (CFREU). 
 To break free from the obligations arising from the EU and international human rights law, the EU 
Frontier Member States facing exceptional irregular arrivals leaned towards extraterritorial migration and 
asylum controls. To this end, the frontier Member States used development assistance, trade incentives 
and other returns to export their agendas of the securitisation of migration to third countries.2 Thereof, the 
expansion of state authority through bilateral externalisation agreements became the most preferred 
security approach of the EU frontier Member States. These externalisation agreements are widely available, 
but their practices are more challenging to determine. There are yet also informal practices that are built 
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around such existing agreements – or sometimes in the absence of agreements.3 These informal migration 
controls not only undermine human security but also weaken the significance of the Refugee Convention 
and the EU Law. This makes us a question how come an EU Member State, which has made a solemn 
declaration to respect the Union laws and the human rights derived therein, can cause grave human rights 
violation extraterritorially? 
 Our paper looks at migration management in Hungary and Serbia to reflect on how Hungary expands its 
state authority beyond its territorial limits to exercise control over the management of asylum in Serbia. 
During our field visits to Szeged and other small towns at Hungary–Serbia border, as well as the Vojvodina 
province of Northern Serbia, we came across extensive involvement of Hungary in the management of 
irregular migration in Serbia. Hungary exercises informal control over the management of refugee camps in 
Serbia and informally imposes a profile of people to gain access to the Hungarian transit zones from Serbia 
and therefore seek asylum in Hungary. Given the informal nature of Hungary’s cooperation with Serbia, the 
paper examines two interrelated questions; i.e. how does a state informally expand its authority over the 
neighbouring state to restrict irregular migration, and what is the future of international refugee protection 
given the informalisation of the securitisation of migration. The paper is divided into two parts. Part one 
analyses Hungarian practices of exercising state authority over neighbouring Serbia and to what extent 
Hungary can succeed in avoiding accountability for human rights violation by the use of informal security 
mechanism. Part two examines the future of multilateral treaties of refugee protection in light of the 
expansion of state authority through bilateral treaties. 
 
(A) MIGRATION MANAGEMENT AT THE HUNGARIAN TRANSIT ZONES 
 
Existing scholarship shows Hungary’s ever-increasing emphasis on the securitisation of migration to control 
irregular arrivals in the country.4 Hungary’s increased emphasis on the securitisation of migration is linked 
to the unprecedented arrival of asylum seekers, along with the latest wave of irregular arrivals in the EU.5 
2015 was the year of the refugee crisis for the EU as nearly 1.2 million asylum seekers arrived in the EU.6 
Out of these 1.2 million first time asylum applicants, nearly 174,400 asylum seekers applied for asylum in 
Hungary alone, second highest after Germany which received 441,800 asylum seekers.7 Following these 
arrivals, the Hungarian populist government of Viktor Orbán started a massive anti-migration campaign and 
held the EU responsible for endangering security and identity of the Hungarian as well as European 
people.8 The Orbán’s government constructed irregular migration as a foreign invasion on its border and 
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consequently took series of security measures to restrict irregular arrivals from entering in the country, in 
disregard of the obligations arising from the EU Law.9 
 Since 2015, the Hungarian government has repeatedly amended law LXXX on Asylum 2007 to provide 
effective mechanisms to restrict irregular arrivals in the country. The Government Decree promulgated in 
2015 has expanded the list of safe third country of origin (STCO) and safe third country (STC) to exclude 
asylum seekers originating or transiting from the US States that do not have death plenty, the Member 
States of the EU, the Member States of the European Economic Area, the EU candidate states, Switzerland, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.10 Among the EU candidate states, 
initially, Turkey was not on the list of STCs, but later it was also included in the list.11 
 Additionally, by the end of 2015, Hungary built a barbed-wire fence on the Serbian and Croatian borders 
to stop cross border infiltration.12 Along with the border fences, Hungary has established two transit zones 
which are on the Hungarian soil but open towards Serbia. Theses Transit zones consist of a series of 
containers covered by wire fence all round and guarded by the Hungarian armed forces. Every day, limited 
numbers of asylum seekers are admitted in the transit zone to process their asylum applications. Practically 
asylum seekers admitted in the transit zones remain detained in the transit zones for an indefinite period. 
Those admitted in the transit zones have the only option of leaving towards Serbia with consequences of 
their asylum application being terminated. Following the establishment of the transit zone, during the first 
three quarters of 2016, Hungary admitted only 20-30 asylum seekers on a daily quota basis, to register 
their asylum claims. The daily quota dropped from 20-30 to; 10 by the end of 2016, 5 in 2017, and 1 in 
2018.13 The daily quota system has forced hundreds of asylum seekers, including Syrians, to wait on the 
Serbian side in the open air without any food provisions. Consequently, asylum seekers started to move 
towards Croatia to seek asylum there.  
 Despite the alarming report of the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention categorising 
Hungary’s policy of holding asylum seekers in the transit zones, a deprivation of liberty under international 
law;14 the judgement of the Grand Chamber shows that the Court has granted Hungary a wide margin of 
appreciation of its right to control borders. However, despite this little relive, the infringement proceedings 
initiated by the EC, the judgement of the ECtHR holding Hungary responsible for violation of Art 3 of the 
ECHR, and flagrant criticism of international organisations has forced Hungary to look for other ways. 
Considering the stance of the ECtHR in the cases of Hirsi and Jamma v Italy and Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary, 
Hungary intended to adopt such security practices, the responsibility for which could not be attributed to 
Hungary. Therefore, Hungary externalised its securitisation policy through bilateral cooperation with 
neighbouring Serbia to informally control irregular arrivals extraterritorially. 
 Accordingly, Hungary adopted a policy of selective admission in the transit zones, to avoid the 
contradiction of the EU and international law. To pursue the policy of selective admission in the transit 
zones, Hungary needed the cooperation of Serbia. However, any formal bilateral cooperation with Serbia 
was likely to bring more human rights challenges against Hungary for the reason of having effective control 
migration management in Serbia.15 Therefore, Hungary opted to exercise informal control over irregular 
arrivals at the Hungarian transit zones through informal cooperation with Serbia. Accordingly, Hungary’s 
securitisation policy transformed to a whole new level of informalisation. 
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(1)  Informalisation of Migration Control at Hungary-Serbia Border 
 
Since autumn 2016, the SCR has stopped asylum seekers from approaching the Hungarian transit zones to 
claim protection. The SCR started to accommodate asylum seekers in temporary reception centres under 
the management of the Commissariat.16 Asylum seekers entering the temporary reception centres are 
asked whether they want to enter the Serbian or the Hungarian asylum system. Those wishing to enter 
Hungary are placed on the waiting list prepared by the SCR.17 The list is handed over to community leaders, 
chosen by the Serbian commissariat from the reception centre. The community leaders communicate the 
list to Hungarian authorities at the transit centres.18 Since the start of the above process, only community 
leaders are allowed to stay in the pre-transit zones. At the Röszke transit zone, community leaders are 
accommodated in a heated tent, while at the Tompa transit zone, community leaders reside in an 
abandoned duty-free shop.19 The Hungarian authorities provide food to the community leaders.  
 There are no permanent community leaders because of a short stay of asylum seekers in the reception 
centres. The SCR chooses community leader randomly from the asylum seekers entering in the reception 
centres.20 Once the Hungarian authorities receive the list from the community leader, they review the list 
and decide on the names of people to be admitted in the transit zones. The revised list is handed back to 
the community leader, who then communicates the list to the SCR. Once the Serbian Commissariat receives 
the approved list from the Hungarian authorities, the Commissariat informs the people accepted for 
admission in the transit zones.21 Those approved for admission in Hungarian transit zones are brought to 
the pre-transit zone a day before their admission. During the entire process, there is no direct 
communication between the Hungarian and Serbian authorities.22 
 Since March 2018, Hungary has stopped admitting asylum seekers from the Serbian reception centres, 
except the Subotica reception centre. The Subotica reception centre has the capacity of accommodating a 
maximum of 60 people at a time.23 According to the SCR, the criteria for acceptance in the Subotica 
reception centre are the time of arrival and the extent of vulnerability. Therefore, the numbers of asylum 
seekers wishing to enter in the Subotica reception centres has increased while the centre’s capacity to 
accommodate asylum seekers remains limited. Therefore, significant malpractices have been taking place 
to admit asylum seekers in the reception centre. During our visit to the centre, we noticed significant 
similarities between the profiles of the asylum seekers in the centre and the Hungarian recognition profile. 
We noticed that Afghan families formed the majority of asylum seekers accepted in the centre. It was also 
surprising that despite the amendment in the Asylum Act, which provided ground for the Hungarian 
authorities to declare an asylum application inadmissible for the reason of staying or travelling through 
Serbia,24 asylum seekers were still eager to enter the Subotica reception centre for admission in the 
Hungarian transit zones. 
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 According to the staff members of the SCR at the Subotica reception centre, most of the asylum seekers 
staying at the centre see Hungary as a transit state for the onward journey towards Western European 
states. Therefore, they negotiate with the Hungarian police for their admission in the Hungarian transit 
zones.25 The profiles of the asylum seekers accepted in Subotica reception centre, and the practice of 
asylum seekers’ negotiation with the Hungarian police raised our concern about the presence of 
malpractices at the Hungarian-Serbian transit route. When we inquired different asylum seekers at the 
reception centre and staff member of the SCR, we came to know that some asylum seekers paid 1000 
euros to move their names on the top of the list for admission in the Hungarian transit zones. Further, the 
Hungarian police officials were more likely to negotiate with asylum seekers who want to transit through 
Hungary and willing to pay. We also heard the story of a single father accompanying a child, who paid 3000 
Euros for admission in Hungary and within a week he managed to reach Germany.26 Hence, Hungary’s 
informal border security practices, in addition to extraordinary human rights abuses, are also corrupting 
the asylum system of the EU and Serbia. This situation has created a new smuggling network in the 
backyard of the EU.  
 
(a) Attributing Responsibility for Human Rights Violations through Informal Control 
 
Asylum seekers’ access to international protection based on the list violates Article 6(4) of the Asylum 
Procedures Directive (APD).27 The Article reads as the Member States shall ensure that a person, who has 
made an application for international protection, has an effective opportunity to lodge it as soon as 
possible.28 The practice of accepting asylum application only at the border transit zones, through the list 
profiling asylum seekers in the Serbian Subotica reception centre is against the Common Standards of the 
APD. Article 43(1) of the APD allows the Member States to establish transit zones at the external borders.29 
However, Hungary only allows asylum applications to be submitted within such transit zones where access 
is granted to a limited number of people after a prolonged delay.30 Additionally, access to international 
protection based on the list violates Article 21 of the CFREU and Article 14 of the ECHR.31 The Articles 
prohibit discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, religion, or 
nationality.  
 Furthermore, limited access to international protection at the Hungarian transit zones also undermines 
the right to apply for asylum guaranteed under Article 18 of the CFREU.32 The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has reported massive push backs from Serbia.33 According to UNHCR, 
asylum seekers entering Serbia are briefly deprived of their liberty, searched, and threatened, often with 
the use of force, to go back to North Macedonia.34 Therefore, asylum seekers exclusion from Hungary is 
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highly likely to cause indirect refoulement of asylum seekers, prohibited under Article 33 of the Refugee 
Convention,35 Article 4 of the CFREU,36 and Article 3 of ECHR37. However, it remains unclear as to what 
extent Hungary could be held responsible for informal exclusionary practices.  
 By restricting irregular arrivals at the Hungarian transit zones through informal security cooperation 
with Serbia, Hungary has tried to establish that it no longer detains asylum seekers in the transit zones.  
Additionally, by approving the list, Hungary authorises access to transit zones to only those asylum seekers, 
who are highly likely to be recognised as refugees. Therefore, Hungary no longer expels asylum seekers 
from its transit zones as well. Accordingly, with the assistance of the SCR, Hungary has ensured that there 
are no more human rights challenges for arbitrary detention, inhuman and degrading treatment, and 
refoulement of asylum seekers. Therefore, this secret cooperation has helped Hungary to dissolve grounds 
of infringement proceeding triggered by the EC against Hungary.38 To attribute responsibility to Hungary for 
extraterritorial violation of human rights, we have to establish Hungary’s effective control of on the 
migration management in Serbia, particularly at the Subotica reception centre. Therefore, we have to see 
to what extent a state can be held responsible for the acts of another state. Nevertheless, before 
attributing responsibility to Hungary of the acts of the SCR, we have to establish the existence of effective 
control of Hungary on the migration management in Serbia. In the present case, since communication 
between both states is done through the community leaders; therefore, we have to determine to what 
extent both cooperating states can be held responsible for the acts of the community leaders.  
 According to International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Wrongful Acts 
2001 (DARSWA), a contracting state is responsible for extraterritorial violations of human rights, when a 
state directs and controls another state in the commission of an internationally wrongful act.39 Therefore, 
to hold Hungry responsible, it must be established that Hungary enjoys effective control over migration 
management at the Subotica reception centre. In the case of Hungary-Serbia cooperation, smooth running 
of operations regarding the preparation of the list by the SCR and the tacit approval of the list by the 
Hungarian authorities shows that actions of both states are alien for a common outcome. Therefore, the 
conduct of the community leaders is of the utmost importance here. Article 8 of the DARSWA states that 
the conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a state under international law if 
the person or group of persons is acting on the instruction of, under the direction or control of, that state in 
carrying out the conduct.40  
 In the present case, there exists a special factual relationship between the conduct of the community 
leaders and the collaborating states. By handing over the list of asylum seekers proposed for admission in 
the Hungarian transit zones, the Serbian Commissariat passes explicit instruction of delivering the list to the 
Hungarian authorities at the transit zones. Similarly, after examination of the proposed list, handing over 
the approved list by the Hungarian authority for delivery to the SCR shows that the conduct of the 
community leaders has a specific factual relationship with the authorities of both states. Hence, the role of 
the community leaders correlates to the acts of volunteers, missionaries, or agents working without official 
capacity commissioned to carry outs specific tasks domestically or overseas. International law wildly 
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attributes responsibility to the state for the conduct of its agents if there exists a specific factual 
relationship of the agent with the state concerned.41 
 By providing accommodation and food to the community leaders in the transit zones during their stay at 
the transit zones to perform the service of communicating the list, Hungary had a factual relationship with 
the community leaders, which entitle Hungary to control the conduct of the community leaders. In the case 
of Cyprus v. Turkey, the Commission on Human Right, the former body of the ECtHR held that Turkey had 
effective control on the conduct of private individuals, who violated the rights of Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots in Northern Cyprus. 42  The Commission relied on the principle of connivance to attribute 
responsibility to Turkey for extraterritorial human rights violation at the hands of private parties. State 
responsibility for the acts of its agents, missionaries, or volunteers has also been recognised in international 
law in the case of Lehigh Valley, where Germany was held to have effective control on the sabotage 
activities carried out by private parties in the United States of America.43 
 Furthermore, according to Article 16 of DARSWA 2001, there could be situations where a state 
voluntarily or for some other reasons, aids or assists another state by facilitating the commission of a 
wrongful act.44 In such a situation, the assistance of the assisting state is not to be confused with the 
responsibility of the acting state; the assisting state will be responsible for its part of the internationally 
wrongful act.45 Hence, by applying the rule of connivance and considering both states factual control over 
the conduct of the community leaders, it could be induced that there exists formal cooperation between 
both states. Thus, it could be argued that Hungary enjoys effective control over the management of the 
Subotica reception centre and control of irregular migration in Serbia. Therefore, Hungary could be held 
responsible for violation of Articles 3, 14 of the ECHR, Article 4 of the Protocol 4 of the ECHR, and Article 4, 
18, 19 and 21 of the CFREU. 
 
(1) Authority of the EU Law in the Presence of Informal Bilateral Cooperation 
 
The idea of unified Europe as a peace project to overcome nationalist forces in the continent and bring 
peace and prosperity for people of the continent is considered to be the founding narrative of the EU.46 
However, due to the unprecedented arrival of asylum seekers, Europe has seen a rapid rise in support of 
nationalist parties, which are critical of the EU addressing the migration crisis inadequately.47 Intensified 
fears about the increasing numbers of refugees and asylum seekers in the European states have increased 
the vote bank of the populist parties. These parties have been harbouring anti-migration sentiments by 
depicting existential threat to national security and identity. At the same time, these nationalist parties are 
also critical of the EU for undermining the Member States´ sovereignty and capacity of governing their 
societies effectively.48  
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 The rhetoric of the nationalist parties in the frontier Member States facing immense irregular arrivals 
has worked so well that the nationalist parties have managed to form governments in Hungary, Italy, and 
Poland. The Hungarian government of the Fidesz nationalist party sees the EU and its common standards 
established under the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) the main cause of the problem. The CEAS 
provides a set of Directives and a Regulation, providing common standards to be implemented by the 
Member States while dealing with asylum applications of third-country nationals. However, instead of 
following the CEAS, the practice of some of the Eastern European Member States to implement national 
measures has become an integration problem for the EU for non-compliance of the EU Law.49 
 The literature on the securitisation of migration in the Mediterranean shows that the EU, itself, supports 
informalisation of securitisation of migration by allowing the Member States to disregard the Union’s 
fundamental values of human dignity, the rule of law, solidarity, and equality, with regard to asylum 
seekers.50 The EU-Turkey Migration Statement is the example of informalisation of migration, where the EU 
hide behind the individual capacity of the Heads of Member States to conceal the involvement of the 
Council of the EU to hide legally binding nature of the agreement with Turkey.51 This Act of the EU severely 
undermined the significance of the EU Law by providing a window for informal securitisation measures to 
bypass the Union’s human rights standards and accountability in both supranational European Courts. This 
informal approach of the EU has also been replicated by Italy, with the support of the EU, to shift the 
responsibility of migration management to Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA).52  
 Above discussion shows that the authority and significance of the ECHR, CFREU, and founding treaties of 
the EU has been seriously undermined the EU institutions itself. The EU’s only problem with Hungary is that 
Hungary has opted for outright control of migration in clear contrast of the EU Law; while, the EU prefers it 
to be done through technical approaches to avoid the impression of undermining the EU Law. In either case, 
the authority and significance of the EU Law have been severely compromised. In the Hungarian case, even 
if Hungary reverts to the EU practices, informalisation of migration will continue to have severe 
implications for the EU Law. However, at the same time, the implications of informalisation are not limited 
to refugees and asylum seekers; the fact that the EU Law can be subjugated creates severe concerns about 





Control of irregular migration and asylum through informal migration cooperation with third countries has 
become the contemporary practice of expanding state authority in the EU. The informalisation of migration 
and asylum cooperation allows Hungary to pursue its securitisation agenda in Serbia without attracting 
responsibility, for asylum seekers exclusion from international protection for the reason of cooperating 
with Serbia. Hungary’s policy of restricting asylum seekers access to the Hungarian transit zones, with the 
informal assistance of Serbia, is the extreme form of informalisation as the authorities of both states 
communicate through private persons. This policy of Hungary undermines the authority of the EU and 
international law. However, under the EU and international law, both Hungary and Serbia have effective 
control on community leader’s activity of communicating between the authorities of both states. Therefore, 
a link establishing cooperation between both states can found by exploring international jurisprudence on 
the state’s responsibility for the acts of a private person. Under the principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
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for the acts of a private person, agent, or missionary Hungary attracts the responsible for asylum seekers 
exclusion from international protection for the reason of controlling, directing, and approving the activities 
of the SCR. Therefore, the process of informalisation can only be stopped if both the CJEU and the ECtHR 
are willing to play a proactive role by expanding their jurisdiction to informal activities of the Member 
States beyond the territorial limits of the EU; otherwise, the prospects of the supremacy of the EU and 
international treaty law look really diminish.  
 
 
